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I.

INTRODUCTION

ACHD raised two issues on appeal. Both issues independently require this Court to
reverse the district court with instructions to dismiss ACHD from this lawsuit.
First, ACHD's powers are limited to those granted to it by the Idaho legislature in statute.
No provision of the Idaho Code empowers ACHD to own a walkway that runs perpendicular to a
street. Rowley suggests that the phrase "adjacent lands", contained in Idaho Code § 40-109(5),
allows ACHD to own all public land "lying near, close or contiguous" to a highway. Similarly,
Rowley interprets § 40-109(5)'s use of the phrase "pedestrian facility" to compel ACHD's
ownership of all public "facilities used by people traveling by foot" in Ada County. Rowley's
reading of these phrases in a vacuum creates an overbroad interpretation of § 40-109(5). Rather,
"adjacent lands" and "pedestrian facility" must be read and interpreted in context, by insuring
that meaning is given to the modifying or limiting phrases "necessary" and "incidental to the
preservation or improvement of the highway." No provision of the Idaho Code, when read in
context and in its entirety, including § 40-109(5), allows ACHD to own the Walk Way.
Second, the language of the 1954 Plat created by the Smiths did not clearly and
unequivocally express an intent to dedicate the Walk Way to the public. Conceding as much,
Rowley raises a number of straw men issues in her Response.

None of the issues raised,

however, can make up for her lack of evidence showing a clear and unequivocal intent-an
essential element of her claim.
Rowley attempts to shift her burden of proof to ACHD by asking ACHD for an
explanation of the Walk Way. But ACHD has no burden to "explain" the Walk Way. It is
Rowley's burden to prove clear and unequivocal intent. Rowley also declares things to be true
that are not. For example, she states on numerous occasions that the Walk Way is identified on
the Plat in the same manner as are the publicly dedicated streets, when in fact the streets are
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identified with a solid centerline that does not appear on the Walk Way.

Finally, Rowley

erroneously presumes a common law public dedication. Much like the district court, Rowley
asserts that the 1954 Plat does not have to show a clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate, but
argues instead that the intent of the owner can be inferred or presumed. Such is an inaccurate
reading of Idaho law. And even if it were an accurate reading of the law, the record before this
Court demonstrates that the Smiths did not have any intent to dedicate the Walk Way to the
public. After all, if the Walk Way was intended as a continuation of Taggart Street as Rowley
claims, shouldn't the Walk Way actually exist as the purported "corridor"? It is both legally and
factually inappropriate to infer or presume a clear and unequivocal dedication of the Walk Way
by the Smiths.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

ACHD CANNOT AND DOES NOT OWN THE WALK W AV.
1.

ACHD Appropriately Raised the Issue of Whether the District Court Erred
in Concluding that ACHD Owned the Walk Way.

A party defending against a claim may move "for summary judgment in that party's favor
as to all or any part thereof." Idaho R. of Civ. P. 56(b). "A moving party is entitled to summary
judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." See Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners 'Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 338, 342,
271 P.3d 1194, 1198 (2012). One ofthe essential elements of either a common law dedication to
the public, or a statutory dedication to the public, is "an offer by the owner clearly and
unequivocally indicating an intent to dedicate the land." Id (common law dedication); Lattin v.
Adams County, 149 Idaho 497,500,236 P.3d 1257, 1261 (2010) (statutory dedication).
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ACHD moved for summary judgment on this one discrete issue: the Smiths did not
"clearly and unequivocally" offer the Walk Way to the public and therefore, as a matter of law,
there was no dedication of the Walk Way to the public. CR, pp. 37-44. The basis of ACHD's
Motion was that Rowley could not make a showing of a "clear and unequivocal" offer of the
Walk Way to the public, an element essential to her case on which she bore the burden of proof.
The district court denied ACHD's Motion for Summary Judgment, and then granted
summary judgment against ACHD on the single issue raised in ACHD's Motion. CR, pp. 16269. The district court did not stop there, however. It then addressed additional issues not raised
in ACHD's Motion including whether ACHD has the statutory authority to own the subject Walk
Way. CR, pp. 169-74.
While a "district court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the
party has not filed its own motion ... a district court may not decide an issue not raised in the
moving party's motion for summary judgment." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 678, 39
P.3d 612, 618 (2001). The rationale for this rule is obvious, "[t]he party against whom the
judgment will be entered must be given adequate advance notice and an opportunity to
demonstrate why summary judgment should not be entered." Id Because ACHD moved only
on the discrete issue of whether the Smiths "clearly and equivocally" offered the Walk Way to
the public, the district court's decision to go further and to grant summary judgment in favor of
Rowley concluding that ACHD has the statutory authority to own the Walk Way was not
appropriate because ACHD did not have an opportunity to respond. Id
ACHD's first opportunity to respond to the district court's decision came in the form of
ACHD's Notice of Appeal to this Court. See CR, pp. 289-294. Therein, ACHD raised 17
potential issues on appeal related to the district court's conclusion that ACHD has the statutory
authority to own the Walk Way. CR, pp. 290-92 (issues c, d, j-x). Subsequently, in its opening
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brief to this Court, ACHD had an opportunity to further identify the flaws in the district court's
analysis on the issue of whether ACHD has statutory authority to own the Walk Way. Rowley
then had an opportunity to support the district court's analysis and/or to provide her own analysis
as to whether the Idaho Code, specifically Idaho Code Title 40 Chapters 13 and 14, provides
ACHD the statutory authority to own the Walk Way.
While not appropriate, the district court's decision to reach issues not raised in ACHD's
motion for summary judgment does not necessarily require reversal.

Mason v. Tucker and

Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 432, 871 P.2d 846, 849 (Ct. App. 1994).

If the district court's

analysis is correct, this Court should affirm. Id.

If, however, the district court's analysis is

incorrect, "neither the ends of judicial economy nor the ends of justice would be well served by
[the] acquiescence in the erroneous application of the law." Ochoa v. State, Ins. Special Indem.
Fund, 118 Idaho 71, 80, 794 P.2d 1127, 1135 (1990) (Justice Bistline dissenting) (quoting Empire
Life Ins. Co. ofAm. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330,334 (5th Cir. 1972)). "Neither the parties nor

the trial judge, by agreement or passivity, can force [an appellate court] to abdicate [its] appellate
responsibility." Id. Because both Rowley and ACHD have now had a full opportunity to address
the issue, if the district court's analysis is incorrect and ACHD does not have the statutory
authority to own the Walk Way, this Court should exercise its discretion, reverse the district
court's decision, and remand with instructions to dismiss ACHD from the lawsuit.
Further, this Court "may exercise its discretion to consider a point for the first time on
appeal where the point involves a pure question of law determinable from uncontroverted facts."
Ochoa, 118 Idaho at 78, 794 P.2d at 1134 (Justice Bistline dissenting). The issue here is one of

statutory interpretation-a pure question of law. 1 Where no provision of the Idaho Code allows
1 Rowley erroneously contends that factual issues preclude this Court from deciding the issue of
statutory interpretation because ACHD may have previously interpreted these statutes
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ACHD to own a walk way that runs perpendicular to two roadways, did the district court err in
concluding that ACHD owns the Walk Way? And if a provision of the Idaho Code allows ACHD
to own the Walk Way, which provision is it?

2.

ACHD is a Creature of Statute, and no Statute Allows ACHD to Own the
WalkWay.
a)

Rowley Ignores the Fact that ACHD is a Special Purpose Highway
District, With Powers Specifically Limited by Statute.

It is undisputed that ACHD, as a highway district, is a special purpose district. See

Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 833, 834, 663 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Ct. App.
1983); see also Kimama Highway Dist. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 298 F. 431, 432-33 (9th Cir.

1924). A highway district like ACHD "is created for a special purpose, to wit, the assessment of
property within the district for the sole and only purpose of improving the highways within the
district." Shoshone Highway Dist. of Lincoln County v. Anderson, 22 Idaho 109, _ , 125 P.219,
223 (1912). Because ACHD is created for a special purpose, its authority is limited to the
powers and duties set forth in the statute.

b)

The Walk Way is not a "Highway" Simply by Being "Adjacent Land"
to a Highway.

Rowley keys on the word "adjacent" citing Webster's Unabridged Dictionary for the
definition: "lying near, close, or contiguous; adjoining; neighboring."

Resp. Br. at 22-23.

differently. Resp. Br. at 21. However, the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable here because it is
well-established in Idaho that the conduct or statements of a governmental agency cannot modify
the meaning of a statute. See, e.g., Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 13738, 997 P.2d 591, 598-99 (2000) ("If equitable estoppel were applied to the statements made by
the SIF's agents, then those agents would have effectively altered the SIF's statutory framework
by granting the policy-holders an ownership interest which the legislature did not intend them to
have.").
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However, the dictionary definition of "adjacent" must be read in the context of the adjectives
"necessary" and "incidental" as those terms are used in Idaho Code § 40-1 09(5).
Section 40-109(5) provides ACHD ownership only over "necessary ... adjacent lands,
incidental to the preservation or improvement of the highways."

See Idaho Code

§ 40-109(5). The Walk Way is obviously not "necessary,,2 in light of the fact that it is not used as
a walk way and is not open to the public. See CR, pp. 33, 35, 36. The Walk Way is not
"incidental to the preservation or improvement,,3 of a highway for this same reason and for the
additional reason that it runs perpendicular to two roadways, not alongside or with the roadway.
Rowley's argument that without the Walk Way the general public would have to detour around
Block 3 by taking Kathryn Street to either Shoshone Street or Broxon Street, and then back to
Taggart Street does not make this Walk Way "necessary" or "incidental to the preservation or
improvement" of highway.
Rowley next cites Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 558, 808 P.2d 1300, 1303 (1991) to
support her contention that the Walk Way is a highway because it is "adjacent" to a highway.
But Freeman dealt with the ownership of a runaway truck ramp that not only ran alongside a
highway, but that was also "necessary" and "incidental to the preservation or improvement of the
highway." See Idaho Code § 40-109(5). Given these facts, this Court said that the runaway
truck ramp was "part of the highway district road system." Id. at 557,808 P.2d at 1302.

2 "Necessary" is defined as "being essential, indispensible or requisite." See Dictionary.com
Unabridged (2013), http://dictionary.reference.comlbrowse/necessary?s=t.
3 "Incidental" when followed by "to" means "naturally appertaining."
Unabridged (2013), http://dictionary.reference.comlbrowse/incidentaL
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See Dictionary.com

c)

The Walk Way is not a "Highway" Simply by Being a "Pedestrian
Facility"

Rowley correctly states that "[n]o case has addressed the meaning of 'pedestrian
facilities'" as used in the context ofIdaho Code § 40-109(5). Resp. Br. at 22. She is incorrect,
however, in stating that "the meaning is self-evident: a facility for people traveling by foot." See
id. Much like her interpretation of the word "adjacent", Rowley's oversimplified interpretation

of the phrase "pedestrian facility" does not consider the phrase in the context of § 40-1 09(5). As
she reads the statute, ACHD has ownership over all "facilities for people traveling by foot" in
Ada County. But the legislature only provided ACHD with the right to own "necessary ...
pedestrian facilities, ... incidental to the preservation or improvement of the highways." See
Idaho Code § 40-109(5).
By Rowley's interpretation, ACHD would have jurisdiction over all paths, tracks,
walkways, footpaths, trails, walks, greenbelts, footbridges, and any other facilities used by
people traveling by foot regardless of its necessity to or connection with the preservation or
improvement of a highway. Certainly the greenbelt, owned and administered by the City of
Boise, would be implicated.
d)

The Walk Way is not a "Public Right-of-Way."

Rowley next contends that the Walk Way is a "public right-of-way" as that term is used in
Idaho Code § 40-109(5) because it was "originally intended for development as a highway."
Resp. Br. at 26. But nothing in the 1954 Plat suggests that the Walk Way was originally intended
for development as a highway. Rowley simply assumes it so; such speculation does not establish
intent. The fact that Taggart Street exists on both sides of the Walk Way in no way demonstrates
that the Walk Way was "originally intended for development as a highway" either as "adjacent
land" or a "pedestrian facility." Moreover, the fact that the Walk Way was not built demonstrates
it was not originally intended for development at all. See CR, pp. 33, 35, 36.
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For Rowley to prevail on this issue, she must first demonstrate that the Walk Way is a
highway as either a necessary "adjacent land" or "pedestrian facility" incidental to the
preservation of a highway. For the reasons articulated in Sections 2.b and 2.c, above, this she
cannot do.

e)

No Other Provision of the Idaho Code Provides ACHD with the
Jurisdiction to Own the Walk Way.

No provision of the Idaho Code cited by the district court, including §§ 49-117(5),
49-117(6), 40-109(5), 40-116(3), 40-310(13), 40-1310(8), 40-1322, 40-1335, 40-1415(1),
40-1415(2),40-2319(6),40-1312,14-1406, 40-1410(2), 40-141O[ ](2), and 40-1313, authorizes
ACHD to own or administer the Walk Way. Besides her overly expansive reading of Idaho Code
§ 40-109(5), Rowley concedes this point. Rowley then makes a specific point to address the
Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"). Resp. Br. at 29. She contends that the LLUPA "does
not oust ACHD's jurisdiction" to administer the Walk Way. Id. She misses the point-there is
no jurisdiction to oust. ACHD's point in citing the LLUPA was to demonstrate that when the
phrase "walk way" is used in the Idaho Code (§ 56-702 and § 67-6518) it has absolutely nothing
to due with ACHD or ACHD's jurisdiction. It is the role of counties and cities to adopt standards
for things like "pedestrian walkways" and "greenbelts." It is not ACHD's statutory charge, role,
or responsibility. See Idaho Code §§ 67-6503, 67-6518.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN PRESUMING THAT THE SMITHS DEDICATED THE
WALK WAY TO THE PUBLIC.

Rowley presumes that "the Walk Way is dedicated to the public to provide a continuation
of Taggart Street's north-south corridor for pedestrian traffic." Resp. Br. at 15. Rowley then
attempts to place the burden on ACHD to rebut her claimed presumption by stating that "ACHD
provides no reasonable explanation to the contrary." Id. ("ACHD spends more time criticizing
the District Court than providing a rational explanation of the Walk Way"). It is Rowley's
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burden to prove the elements of a common law dedication. 4 And, one of the essential elements
of that claim is "an offer by the owner clearly and unequivocally indicating an intent to dedicate
the land." See Asbury Park, LLC, 152 Idaho at 342,271 P.3d at 1198. It is Rowley's burden to
make a showing sufficient to establish this element essential to her case because she is the party
that would bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.
1.

The Smiths did not Clearly and Unequivocally Dedicate the Walk Way to the
Public.

In a failed attempt to demonstrate a clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the Walk
Way, Rowley overstates how the Walk Way is depicted on the 1954 Plat. She states on numerous
occasions that the Walk Way is identified in the same manner as the publicly dedicated streets.
See, e.g., Resp. Br. at 12 ("In this case the Walk Way is delineated and labeled in the same

manner (] as the publicly dedicated streets"); ("Because the Walk Way is delineated in precisely
the same manner as the streets, it too is dedicated to the public as a right-of-way easement."); at
15 ("the Walk Way is delineated and labeled in the same manner as streets"); at 16 ("the Walk
Way at issue is depicted in exactly the same way as other roads"). This is a plain misstatement
of the 1954 Plat. 5 The Plat, in fact, identifies streets with a solid centerline. See CR, p. 16. The
Walk Way is not identified with a solid centerline. Regardless of how many times Rowley states

Whether the Smiths' estate owns the Walk Way, whether the Subdivision owns the Walk Way,
whether the City of Boise owns that Walk Way, or whether someone else owns the Walk Way is
not an issue this Court must decide. The only issues properly before the Court are whether the
Smith's made a clear and unequivocal dedication to the public and whether ACHD has the
statutory authority to own the Walk Way.

4

Rowley spends a significant amount of time discussing the fact that the solid line bordering the
streets is the same type ofline that borders the Walk Way. See Resp. Br. at 9, 10, 11. But solid
lines also border all of the lots. Her focus should be on the solid centerline used to identify the
streets which does not appear on the Walk Way.
5
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that the Walk Way is delineated in the same manner as the streets on the Plat, she cannot change
the fact that the Walk Way is not delineated the same way as the streets.
Had the Smiths wanted to clearly and unequivocally dedicate the Walk Way to the public,
they easily could have depicted the Walk Way in exactly the same way as they did the streetswith a solid centerline. Or the Smiths could have described the subject property as Rowley did
in a survey she had prepared in 2011. Compare CR, p. 16 (the Smiths' description of the subject
property as "Walk Way" in the 1954 Plat) with CR, p. 21 (Plaintiff's self-serving 2011
description of the subject property as "Public Walkway").

The Smith's did nothing to

memorialize a clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the Walk Way to the public.

2.

A Common Law Public Dedication of the Walk Way Cannot be Presumed.

Acknowledging that there is no clear and unequivocal showing of a public dedication on
the 1954 Plat, Rowley attempts to rely on Smylie v. Pearsall, 93 Idaho 188, 191,457 P.2d 427,
430 (1969) for the proposition that the Court can presume a dedication to the public even where
the plat does not clearly and unequivocally show a public dedication. Resp. Br. at 12.
In Smylie, the district court concluded that "[t]hough the county records contain no
formal dedication, the dedication is presumed from the plat and no evidence was presented to
rebut the presumption." Id. at 190,457 P.2d at 429. This Court affirmed noting that "the original
owner's intent to accomplish such dedication may be inferred." Id at 191,457 P.2d at 430. The
Court also relied on the reasoning that "nothing else appearing, it is held that all the streets,
alleys parks or other open spaces delineated on such map or plat have been dedicated to . . . the
public." Id at 192, 457 P.2d at 431 (quoting Cassell v. Reeves, 265 S. W.2d 801 (Ky. 1954».
This Court decided Smylie in 1969-two decades before this Court specifically adopted
the "clear and unequivocal" intent element in Worley Highway Dist. v. Yacht Club of Coeur
D 'Alene, Ltd, 116 Idaho 219, 224, 775 P.2d 111, 116 (1989) (citing Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho
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879, 655 P.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1982)). Since Worley, this Court has stated the same "clear and
unequivocal" element in more than ten decisions. And this Court recently held that the clear and
unequivocal intent must be shown by the plat, not simply presumed as the district court did in

Smylie. See Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 502, 236 P.3d 1257, 1262 (2010) ("The
intent of the owner to dedicate his land to public use must be clearly and unequivocally shown

and must never be presumed." (emphasis added)). Thus, Rowley's reliance on Smylie and her
request for this Court to presume a dedication without the requisite clear and unequivocal
showing should be rejected.
Rowley attempts to distinguish Lattin, but in doing so she admits that the district court
impermissibly presumed the public dedication. Resp. Br. at 16-17. She argues that although the
Smith's intent is not shown by the 1954 Plat it can be presumed because district court's
presumption was "logical and rational" and that the issue was a discretionary call for the district
court. Id. But this Court's holding in Lattin was that "[t]he intent of the owner to dedicate his
land to public ... must never be presumed." 149 Idaho at 502, 236 P.3d at 1262. This Court did
not say a district court can "sometimes presume" or that presumptions are okay so long as they
are logical or rational. This Court said never. Further, this Court reviews the district court's
decision de novo, not for an abuse of discretion. The district court does not have

~iscretion

to

ignore the black letter law of Lattin and presume that the Smiths intended to dedicate their land
to public use. The district court's presumption constitutes reversible error.
Finally, Rowley cites Davis v. Fendell, 158 Wash. App. 1043, *4 (Wash. Ct. App. 20011),
an unpublished Washington state intermediate appellate court decision.

Resp. Br. at 14-15.

Davis is not instructive to the issue at bar because that case was decided under Washington law
which does not require the owners intent to be shown as opposed to presumed.
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3.

The Walk Way is not a "Right-of-Way Easement"

Rowley contends that the "public utilities easements" on the 1954 Plat are necessarily
private easements. Resp. Br. at 11, 17. Rowley cites no statute, case, or other authority to
support this proposition. This is because it is an incorrect statement of the law. An owner can
dedicate land for public or private use. Sun Valley Land & Minerals, Inc. v. Hawkes, 138 Idaho
543,548,66 P.3d 798,803 (2003). The elements of both a common law private dedication and a
common law public dedication are the same: (1) an offer by the owner clearly and unequivocally
indicating an intent to dedicate the land and (2) an acceptance of the offer." Id.
confirms this point by her citation to Ross v. Dorsey, _

Rowley

Idaho _ , 303 P.3d 195, 201 (2013).

See Resp. Br. at 17. By her citation to Ross alone, and with no reference to the facts of this case

including the Owners Certificate on the 1954 Plat, Rowley suggests that the "public utility
easements" referenced on the 1954 Plat were somehow dedicated by the Smiths for private use.
Rowley also cites with a "Cf" signal Volco, Inc. v. Lickley, 126 Idaho 709,889 P.2d 1099
(1995). Resp. Br. at 11. The Volco case provides no support for concluding that the public utility
easements are private easements, and instead demonstrates ACHD's point-it is for the original
owner to determine how their land is dedicated. In Volco, the Certificate of Owners on the
subject plat provided "[t]he easements indicated on this plat are not dedicated to the public but
the rights to use said easements are hereby perpetually reserved for public utilities." No such
language exists on the 1954 Plat. And in fact, the express dedication language of the 1954 Plat
states quite the opposite. It says that all "right of way easements" are dedicated to the public.
CR, p. 16.
The Certificate of Owners states that "[t]he owners hereby dedicate to the use of the
public, forever, all streets and right of way easements not heretofore dedicated as shown on this
plat." CR, p. 16. A "right-of-way" is defined as "[t]he right to pass through property owned by
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another." Black's Law Dictionary at 1351 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, a right-of-way easement is
inclusive of all types of easements including public utility easements. And the only easements
of any kind identified on the 1954 Plat include the easement identified by cross-hatching
between Lots 21 and 22, and the public utility easements identified both on the drawing portion
of the Plat and in the legend on the lower right comer. CR, p. 16.
Neither the district court nor Rowley take the position that the Walk Way is some form of
easement over ground owned in fee by another. Indeed, both the district court and Rowley
contend that ACHD owns the Walk Way. See CR, p. 169 ("ACHD holds title to the walkway");
Resp. Br. at 28 ("ACHD owns the Walk Way"). While the 1954 Plat dedicates "streets" in fee,
the only other interest dedicated to the public are "right of way easements." CR, p. 16. By
definition, an easement is not a fee interest. See Black's Law Dictionary at 548 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining an easement as "[a]n interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the right to
use or control the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific limited purpose."). An
easement "does not give the holder the right to possess, take from, improve, or sell the land." Id
It cannot be disputed that the dedication language dedicates only "streets" and "right-of-way

easements" neither of which describe the interest in the Walk Way ascribed to ACHD by the
district court or Rowley.
This Court has applied the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another) in the context of reading a plat and its written dedication.
See Deffenbaugh v. Washington Water Power Co., 24 Idaho 514, 135 P. 247, 248 (1913).
Applying that maxim in this case, the Plat identifies streets with a centerline and dedicates those
streets to the public. It identifies certain easements with a solid line paired with a dotted line and
dedicates those right-of-way easements to the public. It does not identify the Walk Way as a
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street or a right-of-way easement. Thus, expression of only streets and right-of-way easements
as being dedicated to the public is to the exclusion of Walk Way.

4.

That the Walk Way was not Constructed Shows That the Smiths did not
Clearly and Unequivocally Intend to Dedicate the Walk Way to the Public.

"In determining the intent to dedicate, the court must examine the plat as well as the
surrounding circumstances and conditions of the development ... " West Wood Investments, Inc.
v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 87, 106 P.3d 401, 413 (2005).

Rowley consistently states that the

Smith's intended the Walk Way to be a "north-south corridor" between two segments of Taggart
Street. See, e.g., Resp. Br. at 4,5, 10, 11,24,26. But that was clearly not the intent of the Walk
Way as it was never actually constructed as a street, walk way, or corridor of any kind. See CR,
pp. 33, 35, 36. This "surrounding circumstance" demonstrates that the Smith's did not intend the
Walk Way to be a "north-south corridor." And it further demonstrates that the Smith's did not
clearly and unequivocally dedicate the Walk Way to the public.

5.

At the Very Least, Reversal is Appropriate Because the Record is Ambiguous
as to Whether the Walk Way was Dedicated to the Public.

While it is ACHD's position that the 1954 Plat is clear on its face and the Smiths did not
dedicate the Walk Way to the public, at the very least the 1954 Plat is ambiguous as to whether
the Smiths intended to dedicate the Walk Way to the public. Because of this ambiguity, Rowley
cannot prove an essential element of her claim-whether the Smiths clearly and unequivocally
intended to dedicate the Walk Way to the pUblic. See Asbury Park, LLC, 152 Idaho at 343, 271
P.3d at 1199.
Rowley chastises ACHD for equating "the word 'equivocal' with 'ambiguous.'" Resp.
Br. at 2. Rowley neglects to acknowledge that this Court equated those words, not ACHD. See
Asbury Park, LLC, 152 Idaho at 343, 271 P.3d at 1199 (noting "ambiguous, i.e., unclear and
equivocal" and citing Molyneux v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 54 Idaho 619, 632, 35 P.2d 651, 656
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(1934) which recognized that the dictionary definition of "unequivocal" includes the synonym
"not ambiguous").
Next, Rowley takes the position that for some poorly articulated "policy reasons" a plat
should not have to state "with no ambiguity" what property is dedicated to the public. Resp. Br.
at 2. But that is exactly what this Court has stated Idaho law to be. See Asbury Park, LLC, 152
Idaho at 342, 271 P.3d at 1198 ("Common law dedication consists of (1) an offer by the owner
clearly and unequivocally indicating an intent to dedicate the land ... "); Lattin, 149 Idaho at
502,236 P.3d at 1262 ("The intent of the owner to dedicate his land to public use must be clearly
and unequivocally shown and must never be presumed."). Because the Smith's did not clearly
and unequivocally offer the Walk Way to the public, the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Rowley on this issue should be reversed and this Court should direct entry of
summary judgment in favor of ACHD.

If, however, equivocation or ambiguity in the 1954 Plat is not dispositive of whether the
original owners had a "clear and unequivocal" intent to dedicate the Walk Way to the public, the
appropriate result should be a trial, not summary judgment to the non-moving party. See KeplerFleenor v. Fremont County, 152 Idaho 207, 213-15, 268 P.3d 1159, 1165-67 (2012) (Justice J.

Jones and Justice Horton dissenting).

Where, as here, the district court granted summary

judgment to Rowley-the non-moving party-.the record must be liberally construed in favor of
ACHD. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677-78, 39 P.3d 612, 617-18 (2001) ("In instances
where summary judgment is granted to the non-moving party, this Court liberally construes the
record in favor of the party against whom summary judgment was entered.").

Taking all

reasonable inferences in favor of ACHD, a reasonable person could conclude that the Walk Way
was not clearly and unequivocally dedicated to the public. For this reason, and at the very least,
the district court erred in granting summary judgment in Rowley's favor on the issue of clear and
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unequivocal intent. If an ambiguous plat can provide for clear and unequivocal intent, then this
Court should reverse the district court on this issue so its can be appropriately resolved through a
trial.
C.

ROWLEY IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON ApPEAL.

Rowley must be the prevailing party to be awarded attorney fees under Idaho Code
§ 12-117.

See Building Contractors Ass'n of Southwestern Idaho v. Idaho Public Utilities

Com 'n, 151 Idaho 10, 18,253 P.3d 684,692 (2011). Further, this Court would have to conclude
that ACHD "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Peckham v. Idaho State Bd. of
Dentistry, _

Idaho _,303 P.3d 205, 213 (2013) (quoting Idaho Code § 12-117). Because

ACHD should prevail on both issues raised on appeal, and because there is a reasoned basis in
both fact and law for ACHD pursuing this appeal, Rowley is not entitled to attorney fees on
appeal.
III.

CONCLUSION

ACHD respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court on two independent
bases. First, as a special purpose district, ACHD is limited to the duties and powers provided to

it by the legislature. No provision of the Idaho Code allows ACHD to own the Walk Way which
runs perpendicular to a street. Second, the 1954 Plat does not establish a clear and unequivocal
intent to dedicate the Walk Way to public. Therefore, as a matter of law, the Smiths did not make
a common law dedication to the public.
For these reasons, the Court should reverse and remand this matter to the district court
with instructions to dismiss ACHD from the lawsuit.
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